

Southern Solidarity? A Mixed-Methods Analysis of The G77 in the United Nations General Assembly

GORANA DRAGULJIĆ
Towson University, USA

AND

NICOLAS M. ANSPACH
Arthur J. Glafelter Institute for Public Policy, York College of Pennsylvania, USA

North–South politics are a defining feature of modern international relations. Yet as the Global South becomes increasingly diverse, questions regarding its ability to maintain a cohesive coalition abound. Theories that highlight material motivations suggest that growing wealth heterogeneity across the developing world should undermine its solidarity. However, it is also possible that the South remains united due to a common worldview and the benefits of negotiating as a bloc. Using a mixed-methods approach, we evaluate these theories by analyzing the Group of 77’s behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. Statistical analyses of roll-call votes indicate that the group’s solidarity remains intact even as incomes diverge and that its wealthiest members are the most likely to vote in line with the group. However, interviews with G77 diplomats reveal that quantitative analyses overestimate solidarity since they do not capture resolutions that do not receive a formal vote. In fact, our interviewees question the long-term viability of the coalition due to its economic and political heterogeneity. Overall, evidence points to an enduring Southern solidarity that rests on increasingly shaky foundations. These findings also emphasize the need for scholars to consider how data are generated and account for those processes in their research.

La política Norte-Sur es una característica definitoria de las relaciones internacionales modernas. Sin embargo, a medida que el Sur global se vuelve cada vez más diverso, abundan las preguntas sobre su capacidad para mantener una coalición cohesionada. Las teorías que destacan las motivaciones materiales sugieren que la creciente heterogeneidad de la riqueza en el mundo en desarrollo debería debilitar su solidaridad. Sin embargo, también es posible que el Sur permanezca unido debido a una visión común del mundo y a los beneficios que conlleva negociar como bloque. Utilizamos un enfoque de métodos mixtos que nos permite evaluar estas teorías mediante el análisis del comportamiento del Grupo de los 77 en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Los análisis estadísticos de las votaciones nominales indican que la solidaridad del grupo permanece intacta incluso cuando los ingresos divergen y que los miembros más ricos son los más propensos a votar de forma más afín al grupo. Sin embargo, las entrevistas con diplomáticos del G77 revelan que los análisis cuantitativos sobreestiman la solidaridad, ya que no tienen en cuenta aquellas resoluciones que no reciben una votación formal. De hecho, nuestros entrevistados cuestionan la viabilidad a largo plazo de la coalición debido a su heterogeneidad económica y política. En general, las pruebas apuntan a una solidaridad duradera entre los países de Sur, la cual se apoya en cimientos cada vez más inestables. Estos hallazgos también enfatizan la necesidad de que los académicos consideren cómo se generan los datos y tengan en cuenta esos procesos en sus investigaciones.

La politique Nord-Sud est une caractéristique définitoire des relations internationales modernes. Pourtant, comme les pays du Sud se diversifient de plus en plus, apparaissent nombre de questions concernant la possibilité du maintien d’une coalition cohérente. Les théories qui soulignent les motivations matérielles suggèrent que l’hétérogénéité croissante des richesses dans le monde en développement devrait nuire à sa solidarité. Cependant, il est aussi possible que le Sud reste uni autour d’une vision du monde commune et des avantages de négocier sous la forme d’un bloc. À l’aide d’une approche aux méthodes mixtes, nous évaluons ces théories en analysant le comportement du Groupe des 77 à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Les analyses statistiques des votes par appel nominal indiquent que la solidarité du groupe reste intacte même si les revenus sont différents et que ses membres les plus aisés sont aussi ceux qui ont le plus de chance d’aligner leur vote sur celui du groupe. Néanmoins, des entretiens avec des diplomates du G77 révèlent que les analyses quantitatives surestiment la solidarité puisqu’elles ne représentent pas les résolutions qui ne font pas l’objet d’un vote formel. En fait, les personnes que nous avons interrogées remettent en question la viabilité à long terme de la coalition à cause de son hétérogénéité économique et politique. Dans l’ensemble, les éléments probants indiquent un maintien de la solidarité des pays du Sud qui repose sur des fondations de plus en plus fragiles. Ces conclusions soulignent également qu’il est important pour les chercheurs de s’intéresser à la génération des données et à la façon dont elles représentent ces processus dans leurs travaux de recherche.

Introduction

The Group of 77 (G77) is one of the most important coalitions in international politics, as it represents 134 developing countries that are home to 80 percent of the world’s population. It is also one of the most enduring, having marked its sixtieth anniversary in 2024. During those celebrations,

the G77 noted “with deep concern that the gap between developed and developing countries has continued to widen and that the major challenges generated by the current unfair international economic order for developing countries have reached their most acute expression in current times.” It was thus imperative to reaffirm members’ “full commit-

ment to the spirit and principles” of the group (Group of 77 2024). Yet despite the G77’s emphasis on imbalances between North and South, a systemic economic realignment has taken place in the decades since its founding: parts of the Global South now take a central position within the world economy, and the distribution of wealth among G77 countries has changed as a result. In 1964, the year of the group’s creation, the incomes of nearly all members clustered at the bottom of the global scale. By the G77’s sixtieth anniversary, significant variation had developed, with members represented across high-, medium-, and low-income categories (World Bank 2019).

Whether these economic changes have impacted the G77’s capacity to uphold the core principles of “unity, complementarity, cooperation and solidarity” (Group of 77 2024) upon which it was established is unclear. While it is possible that shifting structural conditions undermine the G77’s ability to coalesce, members may still adhere to a Southern worldview and prioritize solidarity due to the benefits it confers when negotiating in international forums. These possibilities tap into a larger debate about the developing world in modern international relations. Driven in large part by the literature on emerging economies, some scholars argue that growing economic inequalities among developing countries have diminished the ties that once promoted the South’s unity (Berger 2004; Toye 2014). Others maintain that developing countries continue to operate from the perception of a profound North–South divide (Joshi 2013; Vieira 2016) and see in some Southern countries’ economic ascendance the opportunity for more effective political mobilization of the developing world (Vickers 2013; Nayyar 2016). Such mobilization can produce tangible results, as demonstrated by research on the global governance of trade (Hopewell 2015), environment (Draguljić 2020; de la Concepcion 2024), and health (Dauvergne and Farias 2012). An adjudication of these views thus carries not only theoretical implications but also provides insight into the future of North–South affairs, an essential cleavage in international politics.

In this paper, we investigate whether the G77 has been able to maintain its solidarity in the twenty-first century’s international order despite the increasing heterogeneity of wealth among its membership. Because the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the primary venue through which the G77 seeks to advance its interests, we operationalize solidarity—a group’s expression of mutual support and cooperation toward achieving commonly held goals—as acting uniformly when shaping and voting for resolutions the UNGA. Southern solidarity in the UNGA has meaningful implications for global politics and policy. The UNGA is one of the few international bodies whose voting rules advantage the developing world: If they can remain united, developing countries can use their numerical majority to determine the agenda and pass any resolution they like, to great effect. As the UN’s core decision-making body, the UNGA guides the organization’s operations, including its budget. But perhaps even more consequential is the UNGA’s role in passing resolutions that shape global norms on an array of subjects, including peace and security, development, and human rights (Brazys and Dukalskis 2017).

To better understand the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and solidarity within the G77, we use a mixed-methods approach of statistical analyses and interviews of senior G77 diplomats. In our quantitative work, we study the role of wealth within the G77 by examining roll-call votes at the UNGA, both at the group and state levels. These statistical analyses uncover three key trends: The G77’s voting

cohesion at the UNGA is relatively high, the group votes more cohesively as incomes diverge, and it is the wealthiest member states who are the most likely to vote in line with the G77’s majority position. This suggests an optimistic outlook for the Global South’s coalition. Indeed, our interviews reveal that G77 members see great value in the group due to a shared Southern worldview and a recognition of the benefits of institutionalized reciprocity, which is particularly rewarding in the UNGA’s simple-majority decision-making context.

Yet our interviews also demonstrate the importance of looking beyond roll-call data due to their survival bias: Generally, resolutions are put to a vote only if they are likely to pass. This means that resolutions that lack the requisite support from a majority—or those that threaten Southern solidarity—are rarely put to a formal vote and therefore are not captured by the quantitative data. Our interviewees suggest that the G77’s increasing economic and political heterogeneity makes it difficult for the coalition to take meaningful positions on which member states can agree. The result, then, is that G77-supported resolutions that do receive a formal vote often reflect the lowest-common denominator: They are watered-down, weak, or compromised to avoid offending member states and undermining solidarity. For these reasons, our interviewees were universally pessimistic about the coalition’s long-term prospects. Taken together, our findings support the literature that highlights a broadly unified Southern perspective, but nevertheless raise questions about the developing world’s future ability to effectively mobilize. Further, the conclusions drawn from this mixed-method study point toward the importance of considering the processes that precede a formal vote, lest researchers overlook important factors that undermine or threaten solidarity.

The Global South: Together or Apart?

The rise of the Third World is among the most consequential developments in modern international relations. Scholars often identify the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia as the movement’s founding moment (Berger 2004; Williams 2005; Toye 2014). There, twenty-nine mostly newly independent African and Asian states set out to reorient the East–West cleavage dominating international politics around the North–South axis. There, they emphasized issues of self-determination, economic redistribution and development, and the reduction of nuclear weapons (Berger 2004).

Following Bandung, the Third World coalition quickly broadened and institutionalized. In the early 1960s, Latin American countries joined the movement, its leaders concluding that an organized and coherent developing world had the potential to reshape international relations (Toye 2014). Thirty-six governments from across the South articulated this reasoning at the 1962 Cairo Conference on Economic Development, asserting that “joint action by developing countries” could solve their “economic and social problems [. . .] effectively within a reasonably short period of time” and could “promote rapid progress on a wider international basis” (United Nations 1962, 3). The conference statement specified that the United Nations was the ideal venue for such collective action. Indeed, that same year, the Cairo plan led to the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which in turn catalyzed the formation of the Group of 77 (G77) (Sauvant 2014). The G77 declared its goal to be the creation of “a new and just world economic order” (Group of 77 1964)

and became the negotiating arm for developing countries operating within the United Nations system.

To navigate the geopolitics of the Cold War, developing countries established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which also traces its foundations to Bandung and whose membership largely overlapped with the G77. Through NAM, developing countries asserted their rejection of neo-colonialism, their desire for sovereignty, and their independence from the United States' and Soviet Union's conflict. Of course, the superpowers still exerted their influence across the Global South, but developing countries often welcomed the increased economic, political, and military aid that were part of these efforts (Plys 2024). Like the G77, NAM reflected the institutionalization of the idea that unity and cooperation among developing countries could overcome the effects of colonialism. Its growing profile and assertiveness in international relations in the 1960s and 1970s, along with the G77's work within the United Nations, helped usher in the transformation of economic development from an issue regarded as "low politics" to "high politics," which members of both blocs view as a profound achievement (Dubey 2014; Sauvant 2014). With these developments, the South's visibility and influence in global politics rose, and there is some evidence that the North–South cleavage indeed displaced the East–West conflict, especially after the end of the Cold War (Kim and Russett 1996). However, the debate over the extent to which the developing world achieved the level of solidarity its early leaders envisioned remains unsettled.

Historical accounts point to the UNGA's 1974 "Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (NIEO) as the period during which the South's unity peaked (Berger 2004; Toye 2014). The NIEO's adoption seemed to be a crowning Third World achievement, reflecting decades of discussion among developing countries regarding the changes needed to bring about a more equitable international economic system: an overhaul of global trade rules, reform of the international monetary system, financial and technology transfers and assistance, and greater South–South cooperation (SSC). Unfortunately for the South, the political and economic structures that were the coalition's anchor began to weaken soon thereafter. The 1980s were marked by the New Cold War, which weakened the NAM. At the same time, the ascent to power of conservative governments in major Western countries, developing world debt crises, and the rise of neoliberalism narrowed developing countries' economic policy options and pushed the global economy further away from the NIEO's vision (Berger 2004; Toye 2014). By the early 1990s, Southern unity appeared to have reached its nadir. This seemed particularly evident at the Uruguay Round trade negotiations where, in the absence of G77 leadership, developing countries failed to act collectively on any issue. Instead, fluid North–South alliances were a defining feature (Lavelle 2001; Dubey 2014). Going into the millennium, one observer pronounced the G77 coalition as having all but disbanded, noting that even its rhetorical unity had vanished (Lavelle 2001).

In the post-Cold War world, growing heterogeneity of wealth among developing countries has been especially noteworthy (Farias 2019; Lees 2020). As recently as the 1990s, the World Bank classified many as "low income." In subsequent years, however, some states have succeeded in strengthening their economies, while others have languished (see Figure 1). The economically advanced countries are primarily responsible for the increase of the developing world's share of the global economy, which grew

from less than a third in the 1950s to 50 percent in 2018 (Bolt et al. 2018). While this group includes a diverse set of Southern states—such as Indonesia, Botswana, and Saudi Arabia—scholars have shown particular interest in Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, known together as BASIC. The BASIC states stand out because they share the capabilities scholars ascribe to rising powers: economic might, large populations, and military capacity (Kahler 2013).

On the other end of the Southern spectrum are the low-income states, forty-five of which are classified as "least-developed countries" (LDCs; United Nations 2024). Upon the recommendation of UNCTAD, the United Nations created the LDC category in 1971 to increase awareness of the specific needs of countries with the lowest levels of socioeconomic development. The LDC designation tends to generate greater donor attention and carries the benefit of special status in other areas like debt relief and international trade (Toye 2014). LDCs are, however, just one of many relatively new and increasingly vocal sub-groups within the Third World that represent states with low-ranking indicators and particular development challenges (Kasa, Gullberg, and Haggelund 2008; Betzold 2010; Vihma, Mulugetta, and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2011; Farias 2019). In contrast to the rising powers, these states' structural constraints limit their bargaining power in international relations (Vickers 2013).

Whether differences in wealth undermine solidarity among developing countries taps into larger questions about the effects of actor heterogeneity on collective action (see Olson 1965) and states' ability to cooperate (see Oye 1985). Scholars point out that economic differences tend to generate distributional conflicts, which in turn undermine actors' ability to work toward common goals (Snidal 1994; Ruttan 2008). This conclusion seems so intuitive that it is shared by diplomats and policymakers who are attuned to the dynamics of North–South politics (Swart 2014). While the G77 highlights members' economic interests as a source of unity (Group of 77 2020), the literature shows that as incomes of Southern states increase, their policy preferences on issues evolve, often in ways that conflict with those of other developing countries (vom Hau, Scott, and Hulme 2012; Stokes, Giang, and Selin 2016). Speaking specifically to the UNGA context, studies on voting patterns find that wealth influences behavior (Voeten 2000; Carter and Stone 2015; Smith 2016) and that its growth appears to correspond to a greater likelihood of "Western" voting (Voeten 2000). Perhaps, having raised their incomes by reaping the benefits of globalization, economically advanced Southern countries are content to take a more central and prosperous position in the existing global economic system rather than working toward radically restructuring it toward Southern needs (Golub 2013). The harshest critics of the rising powers argue that in their economic repositioning, such states are reproducing patterns of subordination that resemble a Southern neo-colonialism (Gray and Gills 2016).

In addition, the economically advanced states also show greater assertiveness in seeking influence within the international system (vom Hau et al. 2012; Gray and Murphy 2013; Kahler 2013; Stephen 2017) and require less support from the Southern coalition than in the past (Kasa et al. 2008; Vickers 2013; Stokes et al. 2016). This certainly appears to be the case with the BASIC countries, whose frequent coordination with Russia under the BRICS moniker¹ (Ferdinand 2014b; Stephen 2017) and periodic clashes with low-income

¹In 2024, BRICS expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Indonesia joined in 2025.




Figure 1. World Bank income classifications, selected G77 states (1989–2020)

states (Vihma et al. 2011; Vickers 2013) may be evidence of the breakdown of the traditional North–South divide.

Other scholarship, however, suggests that the South can maintain its solidarity despite diverging material conditions, especially within the geopolitical and economic contexts that emerged after the early post-Cold War period. First, there was the affront to sovereignty in the American overreach during the War on Terror. Much of the Global South was similarly wary of an emerging multilateral agenda that focused on issues many viewed as essentially domestic matters: human rights, humanitarian intervention, the rule of law, and democracy, to name a few (Jazairy 2014; Thakur 2020). On the economic front, the 2008 financial crisis exposed the failures of neoliberalism and the West's stewardship of the global economy (Toye 2014). Additionally, while wealth heterogeneity across the developing world has increased, the economic gap between the average Northern and Southern states is also larger than ever and thus indicative of a clear hierarchy (Lees 2020). To developing states, these twenty-first-century developments signaled that not much had changed—powerful countries continued to disregard the needs and rights of the Global South, bending global politics and economics toward their advantage. Even great-power rivalry had returned, prompting the reemergence of the Bandung-era concept of non-alignment (see Heine 2024).

In all, despite shifting global contexts, Global South countries seem to maintain a relatively stable sense of self—an identity shaped by their shared historical experiences with imperialism and the perception that the international system is not responsive to Third World needs (Najam 2005; Williams 2005; Joshi 2013; Vieira 2016; Heine 2024). This appears to be the case for states across the income spectrum: China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, for

example, all continue to view international politics through a North–South lens (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Burges 2013; Joshi 2013; Vickers 2013; Ferdinand 2014a). Memories of imperialism and continuing North–South inequities are similarly fundamental to the worldviews of less developed states (Vickers 2013). This view of belonging to the South may serve as a source not just of collective identity but also of normative leverage and in-group recognition, shaping belief systems that can be drawn upon to mobilize an otherwise diverse group of states (Vieira 2016). There may thus be certain core values and policies—sustainable development, provision of financial and technical resources, and the protection of sovereignty—around which the South can coalesce. This would make it necessary to rethink the straightforward relationship between economic differences and distributional conflict articulated above, at least to the extent that it applies to the Global South.

Indeed, research finds that richer developing countries have appealed to common identity and values to foster solidarity and mobilize the South effectively (Nayyar 2016). For example, Brazil and South Africa have assumed vocal leadership positions to advocate on behalf of the South at the United Nations (Weinlich 2014; Seabra and Sanches 2019). Indian and Brazilian leadership has also been apparent—and has paid dividends—at the World Trade Organization, where the two governments skillfully corralled the Southern contingent to neutralize long-standing European and American dominance (Hopewell 2015). SSC—cooperation that aims to promote international development and is initiated by and among developing countries—also rose significantly, particularly between 2000 and 2015 (see Gray and Gillis 2016; Mawdsley 2019). While Brazil, India, and China receive disproportionate attention in the SSC literature (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Burges 2013; Vickers

2013; Gray and Gillis 2016; Seabra and Sanches 2019), others such as Venezuela, Chile, and Saudi Arabia were also at the forefront of this push (Muhr 2016; Santander and Alonso 2018). As a result, South–South linkages expanded across Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia (Golub 2013; Vickers 2013; Muhr 2016).

The motivations behind major developing countries' promotion of solidarity and SSC are complex. China is an instructive example here. Ideational and ideological considerations indeed shape the country's foreign policy to some degree (Narliker 2013). When China joined the United Nations in 1971, for example, the chairman of its delegation decried "the imperialist and colonialist theory that big nations are superior to small nations" (quoted in Chai 1979, 391). Well into the twenty-first century, China asserts an identity of belonging to the developing world, even as it boasts one of the world's largest economies (Foot 2014; Ferdinand 2014b). It has ramped up its engagement in the United Nations as a way to pursue its interests tied to these seemingly contradictory roles of developing country and great power (Foot 2014). As part of this process, China has taken on a leading role within the G77, in which it holds a unique position: Although China makes financial contributions and is listed as a member on the organization's website, neither its government nor other G77 countries consider it officially part of the coalition. Official statements are therefore usually made on behalf of "The Group of 77 and China." This ambivalent status allows China to express its solidarity with the Global South without being formally constrained by group positions (Baumann et al. 2024).

Scholarship indicates that other major developing countries similarly claim solidarity and promote SSC to gain support from the Global South as they pursue their individual economic and political interests (Burgess 2013; Vickers 2013; Gray and Gillis 2016; Santander and Alonso 2018). While this behavior could be viewed through the lens of exploitation, such an interpretation ignores the agency of less developed countries (Cheru 2016), many of which view their richer counterparts as partners rather than neo-colonial powers (Vickers 2013; Cheru 2016). Indeed, through their expression of support for the BASIC states, less developed countries appear to approve of the latter's growing influence (Johnson and Urpelainen 2020). Further, even if the benefits of SSC are asymmetrical, they can still advance the international standing of the South and individual countries within it (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Cheru 2016; Muhr 2016). All of this suggests that common experiences and interests continue to unite the South, and that the divergence of status among developing states may strengthen, rather than weaken, their coalition's ability to thrive.

In sum, questions remain about the status of Southern solidarity. Some argue that material conditions are leading the Southern coalition to fracture across income levels. Others contend that distinct Southern values and interests remain, and that the developing world continues to act with coherence in certain policy spaces. Existing scholarship therefore presents a muddled picture of the Global South's ability to mobilize in international relations.

The G77 at the UNGA

To assess the relationship between Southern solidarity and wealth, we analyze the G77's behavior when shaping and voting for resolutions in the UNGA. We make this choice for three reasons. First, the UNGA is unique because it represents the views of nearly all of the world's sovereign governments on a multitude of global issues over a long period of

time. It is therefore the ideal venue to study the alignment of foreign policy among the Global South. Second, the G77 was founded expressly to promote Third World interests and redress North–South inequalities at the United Nations, a purpose reaffirmed by its sixtieth anniversary statement (Group of 77 2024). This makes the G77's behavior in the UNGA an excellent indicator of Southern solidarity, and the bloc's performance there has important implications for the South in other international forums: If the developing world coalition cannot hold together at the UNGA, its prospects in other international arenas are dim. Finally, the stakes for Southern solidarity at the UNGA are high, as it is one of the few international bodies whose simple-majority voting rules favor the developing world: If united, the G77 can leverage its majority to shape the agenda and pass favored resolutions, giving the developing world control over important administrative, normative, and legal outcomes.

Resolutions pertaining to internal operations are binding. They give the General Assembly the authority to make organizational decisions, such as approving the UN budget and considering the powers and functions of other UN organs. Other resolutions, in which the GA is tasked with considering, discussing, and making recommendations on the range of global issues (peace and security, human rights, the promotion of international cooperation and law, and social, cultural, educational, and health matters), are considered soft law. This quality has garnered significant scholarly attention that questions the instruments' impact (see Mesquita and Pires 2023 for a summary). There is some consensus that the GA has established itself as a body that shapes and promotes international norms and that therefore, at the least, it has ideational influence in the international system (Joyner 1981; Brazys and Dukalskis 2017). Yet beyond that, UNGA resolutions can also over time foster the "hardening" of soft law, most obviously when the GA convenes conferences that generate legally binding agreements (Mesquita and Pires 2023). For these reasons, international actors, including the great powers, take the UNGA process quite seriously. Indeed, such is the importance of some resolutions that vote-buying by richer member-countries is a well-established phenomenon (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Brazys and Dukalskis 2017).²

In the sections below, we utilize mixed methods to study the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and Southern solidarity. We first use UNGA roll-call votes as a proxy for state preferences and foreign policy alignment, an approach so common that it appears in more than 100 published articles (Morse and Coggins 2024). However, roll-call analyses tell only a partial story, as recorded UNGA votes are not representative of the population of all policies considered by G77 member states. Generally, over 70 percent of resolutions are passed by consensus, and those that are put to a vote are usually backed by a coalition of countries confident in their passage (Peterson 2005). This means that a formal vote is less likely to occur without the G77's support. With this recognition that there is a survival bias in the quantitative data, we also present evidence from interviews with three former G77 officials to provide greater insight into how the group's collaborative process shapes resolutions and fosters solidarity. In what follows, we first provide descriptive analyses of the relationship between the G77's

²Because roll-call data are unable to account for the processes that precede a formal vote, we also examine the G77's sponsorship of draft resolutions, particularly those that never received a formal vote. We detail the dynamics of sponsorship and present its analysis in the Online Appendix. Results suggest that the G77's solidarity extends to sponsorship, but as our interview data indicate later in the manuscript, this solidarity rests on increasingly shaky foundations.




Figure 2. Wealth heterogeneity and G77 voting cohesion at the UNGA

wealth heterogeneity and its voting at the UNGA. We then use a combination of clustered logit analyses and interview data to assess the state-level determinants of voting with the G77, again highlighting the role of wealth heterogeneity.

G77 Voting Behavior at the UNGA

In this section, we describe the relationship between wealth and the voting patterns of the G77 throughout the group's existence, from 1965 through 2022. We utilize the UNGA Voting Dataset (Voeten 2013), which contains all information for every contested UNGA resolution, including each resolution's issue area(s) and each state's vote. For these analyses, we focus on five issue areas that were instrumental to the G77's founding and remain motivating concerns today: economic development, nuclear weapons, disarmament, colonialism, and the Palestinian conflict.

To get a sense of how wealth heterogeneity may shape Southern voting behavior at the UNGA, we operationalize solidarity in two different ways. The first utilizes a cohesion score that quantifies the degree to which the G77 "speaks with one voice" on a per-vote basis (Hosli et al. 2010). The second operationalization is an ideal point estimate for each state, generated from the totality of that state's roll-call votes for each session of the UNGA (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). We use these two operationalizations as a robustness check: If both the per-vote measure (cohesion) and the per-session measure (ideal point estimates) reach similar conclusions, we are more confident in our description of the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and Southern solidarity.

To construct the cohesion score, we code all "yes" votes as 1 and all "no" and "abstain" votes as 0 (Iida 1988; Voeten 2000; Volgy et al. 2003).³ We calculate the cohesion (C) of G77 votes as a percentage with $C = |PV_x - 0.5| \times 2 \times 100$,

³It should be noted that how to code abstentions is a matter of debate in UNGA scholarship. We follow Iida (1988), Voeten (2000), and Volgy et al. (2003) by coding abstentions as equivalent to "no" votes, as substantively, such votes are not in support of the resolution and thus do not contribute to its passage. Further, it has become common practice for states to abstain from a vote on a resolution that they oppose to maintain the appearance of solidarity (Morse and Coggins 2024). Coding such abstentions as missing, then, may artificially inflate the bloc's cohesion. Still, for robustness, we include additional analyses in the Online Appendix, in which we code abstentions as missing (see Boockman and

where PV_x indicates the proportion of "yes" votes on UNGA resolution x . Using this equation, if all members vote yes (or no) on a particular resolution, $C = 100$, indicating perfect cohesion. Conversely, if a voting bloc is split evenly between yes and no votes, $C = 0$, representing a total lack of cohesion. In Figure 2, we graph the G77's mean cohesion score for each year as a function of the heterogeneity of the bloc's wealth (measured as the logged standard deviation of member states' annual GDP).

The second analysis of the relationship between the G77's behavior at the UNGA and the heterogeneity of the group's wealth uses state-level ideal point estimates, calculated using roll-call votes from 1946 through 2023 (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Though this measure's substantive meaning represents alignment with a US-led liberal order, it is useful for our purposes. If there is a convergence of preferences among G77 members, the bloc is voting uniformly within the UNGA. A wide range of ideal points, on the other hand, suggests a lack of solidarity within the venue. Figure 3 plots the dispersion of the G77's ideal point estimates (measured in standard deviations) as a function of the heterogeneity of the G77's wealth (again measured as the logged standard deviation of member states' annual GDP). Like Figure 2, each point in Figure 3 represents a different year of the G77's existence.

Straightforward linear regression may not capture the full dynamic of the relationship between wealth heterogeneity and UNGA voting patterns, especially if the tail of wealth's distribution skews the results. To address this, we construct locally estimated scatterplot smoothers (LOESS) for both analyses, which repeatedly conduct a series of rolling linear regressions through subsamples of the data. Figure 2 and Figure 3 each reveal a positive relationship between wealth heterogeneity within the G77 and the group's solidarity within the UNGA. In both analyses, solidarity within the G77 was lowest in the 1960s. As wealth heterogeneity increases, however, so does solidarity: cohesion increases (Figure 2), while the dispersion of ideal point estimates decreases (Figure 3). This points to the possibility, discussed in our literature review and explored further in our interviews, that richer developing countries use the newfound

Dreher 2011). Those analyses yield only minor substantive differences, which we highlight in footnote 2.




Figure 3. Wealth heterogeneity and G77 UNGA ideal point dispersion

influence that comes with the attainment of wealth to promote Southern solidarity. But importantly, these trends flatten in the 1980s to the point where solidarity remains near-constant even as the gap between rich and poor members of the G77 widens. This flattening suggests that the influence that accompanies wealth accumulation has diminishing returns: Once wealthy countries have enough resources to corral votes, additional wealth does not correspond to greater cohesion.

Determinants of G77 Voting Behavior

In the previous section, we conducted group-level analyses to describe the relationship between solidarity and wealth heterogeneity in the G77. Here, we turn to the state level, using both quantitative and interview data to determine whether and how wealth influences individual members' willingness to maintain Southern solidarity.

In our statistical analyses, we conduct a series of logit regressions predicting the probability of voting with the G77's majority position on UNGA roll-call votes between 1965 and 2022, clustered by roll-call vote. Our key independent variable for these regressions is relative per capita GDP, measured as a state's distance (in standard deviations) from the mean per capita GDP of the G77 at the time of the vote. To ensure that our results are not driven by regional groups or other sub-groups, we control for each state's region, its status as a BASIC country, and its status as an Islamic state. We also control for regime type, measured using each state's Polity5 score (Marshall and Gurr 2018).

Table 1 displays the results of these logit regressions. The first column analyzes every UNGA roll-call vote in the time period under study, while the subsequent columns display analyses of issue-specific votes, included to ascertain whether specific issues drive the aggregate analysis results. Our results are inconsistent with the notion that a state's enrichment relative to the rest of the G77 would lead it to defect from the group's majority position. Indeed, in line with Figure 2 and Figure 3, we find the opposite to be the case: as individual members gain relative wealth, they become *more* likely to vote in line with the rest of the G77. This is true for the aggregate analysis as well as the issue-specific regressions pertaining to economic development, nuclear

weapons, arms control, colonialism, and the Palestinian conflict.⁴

We note that wealth's effect remains robust even after accounting for regime type, region, and status as an Islamic state (each of which generally has its own influence on voting behavior). However, the BASIC variable is particularly interesting, as much has been written about these countries' role as leaders of the developing world. Our analyses show that in the aggregate, BASIC membership is associated with a lower likelihood of voting with the G77. This appears to be driven by resolutions pertaining to nuclear weapons and arms control. This finding can perhaps be explained by China and India's desire to protect their nuclear power status, which is at odds with the developing world's general preference for nuclear disarmament. We further discuss the role of the BASIC countries below.

To better understand the results presented in Table 1—and to account for the survival bias inherent in analyzing UNGA roll-call votes—we conducted interviews with G77 officials in the Fall of 2021. The interviews took place via Zoom and were semi-structured, confidential, and anonymous. Through initial contact with the G77 Secretariat and subsequent snowball sampling, we recruited three members of a United Nations delegation that recently held the G77 Chair.⁵ Combined, our interviewees have over five decades of experience as both diplomats and staff at the United Nations headquarters in New York. Among many roles, they have worked across UN entities like the Development Programme and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, served as General Assembly Vice Presidents and Committee Chairs, and led their delegation as Ambassadors.

The UNGA's agenda is vast, and the process of drafting a resolution is cost-intensive, requiring legal and technical expertise as well as the support of other states. Therefore, most delegations belong to multiple groups that provide important burden-sharing functions for their members. These include attending committees, workshops, and dinners, and broadly sharing information that bolsters admin-

⁴When we code abstentions as "missing," the effect of relative GDP per capita on votes pertaining to colonialism becomes statistically insignificant (see Appendix). Relative GDP per capita's effect remains significant in every other analysis.

⁵G77 Chairs rotate annually and by region.

Table 1. Determinants of voting with the G77 majority position

	ALL ISSUES	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	NUCLEAR WEAPONS	ARMS CONTROL	COLONIALISM	PALESTINE
GDP per capita	0.11 (0.008)	0.098 (0.022)	0.21 (0.027)	0.15 (0.018)	0.086 (0.024)	0.30 (0.047)
Polity5	0.025 (0.002)	0.040 (0.005)	0.026 (0.003)	0.039 (0.003)	0.025 (0.004)	0.025 (0.003)
BASIC	-0.66 (0.079)	-0.23 (0.17)	-2.24 (0.10)	-1.79 (0.12)	0.33 (0.48)	2.57 (0.46)
Region: Americas	1.32 (0.061)	1.36 (0.23)	1.88 (0.14)	1.77 (0.13)	1.28 (0.16)	0.20 (0.12)
Region: Africa	1.93 (0.063)	1.91 (0.24)	2.54 (0.15)	2.54 (0.14)	1.99 (0.16)	1.19 (0.13)
Region: Middle East	1.56 (0.068)	1.53 (0.24)	2.63 (0.18)	1.86 (0.15)	2.43 (0.20)	1.82 (0.19)
Region: Asia	1.68 (0.062)	1.56 (0.23)	1.36 (0.13)	1.49 (0.13)	2.37 (0.16)	1.93 (0.15)
Region: Pacific	1.50 (0.067)	1.76 (0.25)	2.25 (0.17)	2.40 (0.16)	1.45 (0.18)	-0.025 (0.13)
Islamic	0.36 (0.022)	0.23 (0.073)	0.35 (0.052)	0.14 (0.044)	0.51 (0.068)	0.78 (0.060)
<i>N</i>	351,878	37,317	64,625	74,861	49,893	70,052
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.023	0.017	0.073	0.047	0.051	0.104
Wald χ^2	1804.98	169.34	1301.73	1069.08	334.85	1216.86

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant coefficients ($p < 0.05$) presented in bold.

istrative, political, and staff capacities (Panke 2013). As the largest group whose membership holds a majority of UNGA votes, the G77 is particularly influential. Though the group has a standing agenda that it promotes during each UNGA session, individual members may also approach the Chair to place a new issue on its docket. Delegations meet both formally and informally to forge agreement on positions and draft resolutions, which, importantly, must be achieved by consensus (Interview 2).

In line with the literature that speaks to a distinctly Southern identity and perspective (e.g., Najam 2005; Joshi 2013; Vieira 2016), G77 members appear to share a broadly unifying worldview, especially regarding global economic conditions. Echoing the G77 anniversary statement, our interviewees conclude that “the material conditions for the South have changed very little” (Interview 2) and describe the common circumstances of many developing countries: reliance on primary commodity exports, dependence on Western financing, significant debt, and a general distrust of the major international financial institutions. Although they recognize that some Southern countries have made significant strides in development, our interviewees maintain that even economically advanced states nonetheless identify with the development challenges that the G77 faces. The North–South divide is therefore still pronounced, and indeed seems to have grown more acrimonious and confrontational in recent years (Baumann et al. 2024). The cleavage shapes not just how delegations view the issues but also each other: one interviewee described the European delegates as “colonialistic” in their interactions with the G77, noting they approach negotiations with the South with an air of intellectual, technical, and economic superiority (Interview 1).

While a Southern identity shapes G77’s members’ perspectives and policy preferences, the institutional context of the UNGA is key to explaining the practices that foster solidarity. As discussed previously, the UNGA’s simple-majority decision-making structure incentivizes developing countries

to vote as a bloc. G77 members have thus developed institutionalized reciprocity—the “tit for tat” practice of mutually supporting each other’s priorities. Repeated interactions and the UNGA’s long “shadow of the future” create the expectation that cooperation with other G77 members will be rewarded (Iida 1988; Baumann et al. 2024; Oye 1985). When asked what factors enable the G77’s solidarity, interviewees agreed that their power in numbers (see Draguljić 2020) is the membership’s key strength and worth going to great lengths to preserve: “the thing that keeps the G77 together more than anything else is this quest for solidarity and unity because this is what has served them” (Interview 2). They explained that many developing countries are inconsequential when acting alone. Solidarity is the critical factor that allows these delegations, each independently weak on the international stage, to rely on the support of other similarly situated states. It is important to note that in these assessments, the interviewees were not referring to just the smaller developing countries. Indeed, they presented numerous examples of larger, more economically advanced members foregoing their national positions to achieve consensus. Solidarity has real benefits: rather than being subject to the whims of rich countries in bilateral negotiations, a united front of 134 countries makes it difficult for the North to steamroll or ignore the developing world (Interview 3). This sentiment is echoed in interviews in Baumann et al.’s (2024) recent work on the G77: Delegates explained that they often support G77 positions and resolutions unrelated to their countries’ national interests to signal solidarity. Their assumption was that other members of the group would be similarly supportive of them when called upon. This assessment of individual weakness and collective strength as sources of G77 solidarity echoes the observations of other UN bureaucrats and diplomats who have worked closely with the body (Dubey 2014; Jazairy 2014; Swart 2014).

Our interview data also help explain our finding that richer countries are more likely to vote with the G77’s majority position: Interviewees agreed that wealthier states tend

to drive the G77 agenda.⁶ In other words, the G77 position often is *their* position. In addition to the BASIC states, countries such as Singapore, Egypt, Indonesia, and Thailand were singled out in discussion. Singapore, for example, does not have “the average profile of a typical G77 member. But it stays in because it has a disproportionate influence on decisions and [. . .] the outcome of negotiating processes is quite a bit [. . .] heavily influenced by countries like Singapore” (Interview 3). This may be a fairly straightforward function of capacity: while richer states tend to have larger diplomatic missions, delegations from less developed members are in “basic survival mode” in terms of their ability to follow UN processes (Baumann et al. 2024, 39). G77 decision-making is notoriously time-intensive and requires in-person attendance of meetings, leading observers to estimate that only a small fraction of the membership is consistently engaged (Baumann et al. 2024).

However, our interviews failed to clarify our finding that BASIC membership leads to greater defection from the G77’s majority position. Instead, our interviewees generally viewed South Africa, India, and Brazil as effective leaders of the coalition. Brazil and India, in particular, were identified as members that have consistently sought to foster consensus within the G77.⁷ In contrast, discussions about China took on a less flattering tone, with one interviewee observing a “domineering presence” that attempts to “exercise enormous power” within the coalition in recent years. They accused China of using the G77 to “piggyback on support from developing countries” to promote its parochial interests in disputes with the West and to expand its great-power status (Interview 2). This aligns with the views of delegates interviewed in Baumann et al. (2024, 41), nearly all of whom described China as “omnipresent” in both General Assembly and G77 discussions. They note that China has a tendency to frame its positions as being those of the G77 even when that is clearly not the case and of using the G77 platform to antagonize the North. They also claim that at times China uses its stature in the group in ways that undermine the interests of the average developing country. For example, as one of the developing world’s leading creditors, China blocked proposals on the issue of debt that were made by smaller states (Baumann et al. 2024).

For these reasons, our interviewees (and in their telling, many G77 members) are suspicious of China’s engagement with the group. Despite these misgivings, China wields substantial influence in the coalition due to its economic position (Interview 2). As one interviewee stated, “when China speaks, most of the G77 membership, they listen, and listen very carefully, because of the leverage that China has in their bilateral relations” (Interview 3). More broadly, China also offers the Global South an attractive development model and direct support in negotiations (Baumann et al. 2024). Connecting this to the quantitative analysis, if China is successful at shaping the G77 agenda and India and Brazil are consensus-builders, this would suggest that BASIC membership would, at the least, not impact defections from the G77’s majority position. This finding therefore requires further investigation.

⁶They also pointed out that diplomatic expertise, which does not always neatly correlate to wealth, is another important factor through which countries such as Kenya, Morocco, and Algeria have historically influenced the G77’s agenda (see also Baumann et al. 2024). Further, smaller countries also take on leadership roles, but they are more selective on the issues on which they engage due to their capacity constraints. Their governments, on average, are also less involved during G77 negotiations than those of wealthier members.

⁷However, interviewees noted with disappointment that both India and Brazil have in recent years retreated from their leadership roles.

Overall, the implications of the economically advanced states’ agenda-setting for G77 solidarity are not entirely clear. Interviewees maintained that richer and poorer G77 members share a common worldview and derive important benefits from their collaboration through the body. They also generally viewed the involvement of larger members who take on leadership roles favorably, noting they are effective drivers of consensus. Still, like scholars who have announced the end of the South’s unity (Berger 2004; Toye 2014), our interviewees were highly pessimistic about the members’ ability to maintain solidarity due to their economic differences. They observed that the G77 is stratifying according to the low-, middle-, and high-income economic classifications used by international organizations. This means that “the interests of many of the members of G77 have changed. Sometimes you have countries that are more aligned in their outlook and their general profile with the North” (Interview 3). There are even a few states that belong to both the G77 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and others who are seeking accession to the OECD. This, for one interviewee, presents “a significant conflict of interest” (Interview 2).⁸

For these reasons, our interviewees agreed that it now takes significantly longer to reach consensus positions—single paragraphs can apparently take up hours of discussion (Baumann et al. 2024)—and described such positions as weak, watered down, and compromised (Interview 1, 3). Each interviewee insisted that the G77’s membership and procedures must be reassessed, as “the practice of taking decisions by consensus among 134 countries with different levels of development, different interests, it’s suicide” (Interview 3). The fact that positions that lack (or threaten) solidarity among the Global South rarely receive votes at the UNGA indicates that scholarship that relies solely on analyzing roll-call votes while ignoring the processes that precede a formal resolution risk overestimating solidarity.

Conclusion

Our examination of G77 voting behavior at the UN General Assembly yielded three main findings. First, the G77 maintains its solidarity in its UNGA voting behavior, even as its incomes have diverged. This aligns with recent scholarship highlighting the continued importance of the North–South cleavage and the maintenance of a Southern identity (Vieira 2016; Johnson and Urpelainen 2020; Lees 2020). Shared perceptions of an unequal international order shape the developing world’s international relations (Najam 2005; Joshi 2013; Vieira 2016). These worldviews, along with the institutionalized reciprocity that is incentivized and fostered by the UNGA’s decision-making procedures, are the foundations of G77 solidarity.

Second, we find that relatively wealthy countries are *more* likely to vote with the G77, likely because their delegations’ capacity facilitates agenda-setting power within the group. Our interviewees praised some richer members for their efforts in fostering consensus, supporting the view that less developed states welcome the leadership of the more economically advanced (Cheru 2016; Johnson and Urpelainen 2020). This should all bode well for the South’s ability to influence international negotiations, as the coalition exerts its greatest bargaining leverage when it is united (Hopewell 2015; Draguljić 2020).

⁸In addition to economic differences, interviewees identified the myriad political groupings (e.g., African Group, Small Island Developing States, etc.) and the expansion of the development agenda beyond traditional economic issues as obstacles to G77 solidarity.

However, our interviews revealed a third key insight: those working most closely with the G77 are deeply pessimistic about its ability to remain effective and relevant, expressing alarm regarding the impact of an increasingly economically and politically diverse membership. Uniting members under the G77's consensus-based decision-making procedure is taking longer and resulting in weaker positions. Some fracturing of the South is therefore already taking place (Berger 2004; Stokes et al. 2016), though this is not captured in our statistical analyses due to UNGA roll-call data's inherent survival bias. Indeed, this points to the broader need for scholars to consider how data are generated and to account for those processes in their research.

Acknowledgments

The authors are thankful to Matthew Hoddie and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to our interviewees for their generosity with their time and expertise. The quantitative data generated and analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. Interview data cannot be made available to protect the privacy of participants.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the *Global Studies Quarterly* data archive.

References

- BAILEY, MICHAEL A., ANTON STREZHNEV, AND ERIK VOETEN. 2017. "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2): 430–56.
- BAUMANN, MAX-OTTO, ANNA NOVOSELOVA, JAVIER SURASKY, AND PHILIPP SCHONROCK. 2024. *The Group of 77 and Global Dialogue in the United Nations General Assembly, IDOS Discussion Paper No. 13/2024*, Bonn: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). <https://doi.org/10.23661/idp13.2024>.
- BERGER, MARK. 2004. "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism." *Third World Quarterly* 25 (1): 9–39.
- BETZOLD, CAROLA. 2010. "'Borrowing' Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate Change Regime, 1990–1997." *Politics* 30 (3): 131–48.
- BOLT, JUTTA, ROBERT INKLAAR, HERMAN DE JONG, AND JAN LUITEN VAN ZANDEN. 2018. "Rebasing 'Maddison': New Income Comparisons and the Shape of Long-Run Economic Development." *Maddison Project Database*. Accessed September 9, 2024. https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/html_publications/memorandum/gd174.pdf.
- BOOCKMAN, BERNHARD, AND AXEL DREHER. 2011. "Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?" *Public Choice* 146 (3-4): 443–67.
- BRAZYS, SAMUEL, AND ALEXANDER DUKALSKIS. 2017. "Canary in the Coal Mine? China, the UNGA and the Changing World Order." *Review of International Studies* 43 (4): 742–64.
- BURGES, SEAN W. 2013. "Brazil as a Bridge between Old and New Powers?" *International Affairs* 89 (3): 577–94.
- CARTER, DAVID, AND RANDALL STONE. 2015. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly." *International Organization* 69 (1): 1–33.
- CHAI, TRONG R. 1979. "Chinese Policy toward the Third World and the Superpowers in the UN General Assembly 1971–1977: A Voting Analysis." *International Organization* 33 (3): 391–403.
- CHERU, FANTU. 2016. "Emerging Southern Powers and New Forms of South–South Cooperation: Ethiopia's Strategic Engagement with China and India." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (4): 592–610.
- DAUVERGNE, PETER, AND DÉBORAH BL FARIAS. 2012. "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power." *Third World Quarterly* 33 (5): 903–17.
- DE LA CONCEPCION, RICHARD TUR. 2024. "Negotiating Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits in the BBNJ Agreement: Role of the Group of 77 and China." *Marine Policy* 163: 1–5.
- DRAGULJIĆ, GORANA. 2020. "Power in Numbers: The Developing World and the Construction of Global Commons Institutions." *Third World Quarterly* 41 (12): 1973–91.
- DREHER, AXEL, PETER NUNNENKAMP, AND RAINER THIELE. 2008. "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis." *Public Choice* 136 (1-2): 139–64.
- DUBEY, MUCHKUND. 2014. "The Historical Importance of G-77." *UN Chronicle* 1: 23–6.
- FARIAS, DÉBORAH. 2019. "Outlook for the 'Developing Country' Category: A Paradox of Demise and Continuity." *Third World Quarterly* 40 (4): 668–87.
- FERDINAND, PETER. 2014a. "Foreign Policy Convergence in Pacific Asia: The Evidence from Voting in the UN General Assembly." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16 (4): 662–79.
- . 2014b. "Rising Powers at the UN: An Analysis of the Voting Behaviour of BRICS in the General Assembly." *Third World Quarterly* 35 (3): 376–91.
- FOOT, ROSEMARY. 2014. "'Doing Some Things' in the Xi Jinping Era: The United Nations as China's Venue of Choice." *International Affairs* 90 (5): 1085–100.
- GOLUB, PHILIP. 2013. "From the New International Economic Order to the G20: How the 'Global South' Is Restructuring World Capitalism from within." *Third World Quarterly* 34 (6): 1000–15.
- GRAY, KEVIN, AND BARRY K. GILLS. 2016. "South–South Cooperation and the Rise of the Global South." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (4): 557–74.
- GRAY, KEVIN, AND CRAIG MURPHY. 2013. "Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance." *Third World Quarterly* 34 (2): 183–93.
- GROUP OF 77. 1964. "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development." Accessed September 9, 2024. <https://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html>.
- . 2020. "About the Group of 77." Accessed September 9, 2024. <https://www.g77.org/doc>
- . 2024. "Third South Summit Outcome Document." Accessed September 9, 2024. https://www.g77.org/doc/3southsummit_outcome.htm.
- HEINE, JORGE. 2024. "Active Non-Alignment and Global Governance: From Latin America to the Global South." *Global Governance* 30 (2): 214–24.
- HOPEWELL, KRISTEN. 2015. "Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization." *Review of International Political Economy* 22 (2): 311–38.
- HOSLI, MADELEINE O, EVELYN VAN KAMPEN,, FRITS MEIJERINK,, AND KATHERINE TENNIS,. 2010. "Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European Union." Paper presented at the ECPR Fifth Pan-European Conference, Porto, June 24-26, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Evelyn-Kampen/publication/228356871_Voting_Cohesion_in_the_United_Nations_General_Assembly_The_Case_of_the_European_Union/links/55a6534508aee8aa7656cc3/Voting-Cohesion-in-the-United-Nations-General-Assembly-The-Case-of-the-European-Union.pdf
- IDA, KEISUKE. 1988. "Third World Solidarity: The Group of 77 in the UN General Assembly." *International Organization* 42 (2): 375–95.
- INTERVIEW 1. 2021. By Author. October 28. Zoom Recording.
- INTERVIEW 2. 2021. By Author. November 5. Zoom Recording.
- INTERVIEW 3. 2021. By Author. November 11. Zoom Recording.
- JAZAIRY, IDRIS. 2014. "Fiftieth Anniversary of the G-77." *UN Chronicle* 1: 10–3.
- JOHNSON, TANA, AND JOHANNES URPELAINEN. 2020. "The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Developing Countries' Unity at the Nexus of Trade and Environmental Policy." *The Review of International Organizations* 15 (2): 445–73.
- JOSHI, SHANGRILA. 2013. "Understanding India's Representation of North–South Climate Politics." *Global Environmental Politics* 13 (2): 128–47.
- JOYNER, CHRISTOPHER. 1981. "U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation." *California Western International Law Journal* 11 (3): 10–34.
- KAHLER, MILES. 2013. "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo." *International Affairs* 89 (3): 711–29.
- KASA, SJUR, ANNE GULLBERG, AND GORILD HEGGELUND. 2008. "The Group of 77 in the International Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions." *International Environmental Agreements* 8 (2): 113–27.

- KIM, SOO YEON, AND BRUCE RUSSETT. 1996. "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly." *International Organization* 50 (4): 629–52.
- LAVELLE, KATHRYN. 2001. "Ideas within a Context of Power: The African Group in an Evolving UNCTAD." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 39 (1): 25–50.
- LEES, NICHOLAS. 2020. "The Brandt Line after Forty Years; the More North–South Relations Change, the More They Stay the Same?" *Review of International Studies* 47 (1):85–106.
- MARSHALL, MONTY G., AND TED ROBERT GURR. 2018. "Polity5: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2018." Center for Systemic Peace. Accessed September 9, 2024. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p5manualv2018.pdf>.
- MAWDSLEY, EMMA. 2019. "South–South Cooperation 3.0? Managing the Consequences of Success in the Decade Ahead." *Oxford Development Studies* 47 (3): 259–74.
- MESQUITA, RAFAEL, AND ANTONIO PIRES. 2023. "What Are UN General Assembly Resolutions for? Four Views on Parliamentary Diplomacy." *International Studies Review* 25 (1)
- MORSE, JULIA, AND BRIDGET COGGINS. 2024. "Your Silence Speaks Volumes: Weak States and Strategic Absence in the UN General Assembly." *Review of International Organizations* 19 (3): 515–44.
- MUHR, THOMAS. 2016. "Beyond 'BRICS': Ten Theses on South–South Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (4): 630–48.
- NAJAM, ADIL. 2005. "Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement." *International Environmental Agreements* 5 (3): 303–21.
- NARLIKAR, AMRITA. 2013. "Negotiating the rise of new powers." *International Affairs* 89 (3): 561–576.
- NAYAR, DEEPAK. 2016. "BRICS, Developing Countries and Global Governance." *Third World Quarterly* 37 (4): 575–91.
- OLSON, MANCUR. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- OYE, KENNETH. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38 (1): 1–24.
- PANKE, DIANA. 2013. *Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions: Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- PETERSON, M.J. 2005. *The UN General Assembly*. London: Routledge.
- PLYS, KRISTIN. 2024. "The Cold War from the Global South: Maoism and the Future of Liberalism." *Social Science History* 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2024.22>
- RUTTAN, LORE. 2008. "Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective Action and Collective Goods Provisioning." *World Development* 36 (5): 969–85.
- SANTANDER, GUILLERMO, AND JOSÉ ANTONIO ALONSO. 2018. "Perceptions, Identities and Interests in South–South Cooperation: The Cases of Chile, Venezuela and Brazil." *Third World Quarterly* 39 (10): 1923–40.
- SAUVANT, KARL P. 2014. "The Early Days of the Group of 77." *UN Chronicle* 51 (1): 27–33.
- SEABRA, PEDRO, AND EDALINA RODRIGUES SANCHES. 2019. "South–South Cohesiveness versus South–South Rhetoric: Brazil and Africa at the UN General Assembly." *International Politics* 56 (5): 585–604.
- SMITH, ALASTAIR. 2016. "Leader Turnover, Institutions, and Voting in the UN General Assembly." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60 (1): 143–63.
- SNIDAL, DUNCAN. 1994. "The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6 (4): 449–72.
- STEPHEN, MATHEW. 2017. "Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance." *Global Governance* 23 (3): 483–502.
- STOKES, LEAH, AMANDA GIANG, AND NOELLE SELIN. 2016. "Splitting the South: China and India's Divergence in International Environmental Negotiations." *Global Environmental Politics* 16 (4): 12–31.
- SWART, LYDIA. 2014. "The Voice of the Majority: The Role of the Group of 77 in the General Assembly." *UN Chronicle* 1: 39–41.
- THAKUR, RAMESH. 2020. "The United Nations and the North–South Partnership: Connecting Past to the Future." *Ethics & International Affairs* 34 (3): 305–317.
- TOYE, JOHN. 2014. "Assessing the G77: 50 Years after UNCTAD and 40 Years after the NIEO." *Third World Quarterly* 35 (10): 1759–74.
- UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS. 2024. "Least Developed Countries (LDCs)." Accessed September 9, 2024. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category.html>.
- UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. 1962. "Cairo Declaration of Developing Countries." Accessed September 9, 2024. <https://repository.uneca.org/ds2/stream/?#/documents/80d6b10f13ae53f9-bd40-b87ccc94d00f/page/3>.
- VICKERS, BRENDAN. 2013. "Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the 'Marginalized Many'." *International Affairs* 89 (3): 673–93.
- VIEIRA, MARCO A. 2016. "Understanding Resilience in International Relations: The Non-Aligned Movement and Ontological Security." *International Studies Review* 18 (2): 290–311.
- VIHMA, ANTO, YACOB MULUGETTA, AND SYLVIA KARLSSON-VINKHUYZEN. 2011. "Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations." *Global Change, Peace & Security* 23 (3): 315–34.
- VOETEN, ERIK. 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly." *International Organization* 54 (2): 185–215.
- . 2013. "Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly." In *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*, edited by B. Reinalda, 54–66. London: Routledge.
- VOLGY, THOMAS J, DERRICK V FRAZIER, AND ROBERT S INGERSOLL, 2003. "Preference Similarities and Group Hegemony: G-7 Voting Cohesion in the UN General Assembly." *Journal of International Relations & Development* 6 (1): 51–70.
- VOM HAU, MATTHIAS, JAMES SCOTT, AND DAVID HULME. 2012. "Beyond the BRICS: Alternative Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics of Development." *The European Journal of Development Research* 24 (2): 187–204.
- WEINLICH, SILKE. 2014. "Emerging Powers at the UN: Ducking for Cover?" *Third World Quarterly* 35 (10): 1829–44.
- WILLIAMS, MARC. 2005. "The Third World and Global Environmental Negotiations: Interests, Institutions and Ideas." *Global Environmental Politics* 5 (3): 48–69.
- WORLD BANK. 2019. "World Bank Country and Lending Groups." Accessed September 9, 2024. <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.